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Russia's responsibility for Ukraine's current wartime hardships is uncontested in most of the world. In 2014 Russia annexed Crimea and then attacked eastern Ukraine's Donbas region. No matter how hard Russian President V. Putin tries to deny his crimes, his actions speak louder than his words. Beginning in 2014 and now continuing in 2016, Russia's top leadership insisted that Russian troops were not in Ukraine. For example, in April 2015, V. Putin stated: "One should not even raise a question whether there are our troops in Ukraine. I tell you plainly and definitely -there are no Russian troops in Ukraine." 1 In May 2014, D. Medvedev, Russia's Prime Minister, stated:
I have no desire to even comment on baseless hypotheses about Russia's intention to annex more territories, it is nothing more than propaganda. The most important task is to ease the tension within Ukraine itself. We all see what's going on there; there is nothing else but a civil war there. This is the problem to think over for all of us. In October 2014, he also asserted: "We are very concerned about the situation in Ukraine. We would like the civil war, provoked by a coup at the beginning of the year, to be over." 3 At a meeting with members of the Russian Duma's political party factions on 14 August 2014, V. Putin said:
Unfortunately, Ukraine today is an example of the consequences of a national and civil disruption, radicalism and intolerance. The situation is becoming more and more dramatic; the country has plunged into bloody chaos, in a fratricidal conflict. There is a large-scale humanitarian disaster in the south-east of the country; thousands of people have died; there are hundreds of thousands of refugees who have lost literally everything. It's a tragedy.4
Former Secretary of the Russian Security Council Igor Ivanov likewise characterized the war in Ukraine as a civil war:
The civil war in the territory of the largest European country with the population of 45 million people is an unprecedented event, which undermines our understanding of the state and prospects of development of the modern international system.5
A. Vilkov is sure that this so-called civil war in Ukraine arose from its peoples' misconceptions:
The legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood has been shaped by targeted and consistent actions of the international centers of "promoting democracy," in the framework of the "Eastern Partnership" and many other programs that have formed the Ukrainian citizens' perspective that they belong to progressive European civilization, and have nothing in common with the imperial archaic Russian mentality. One only needs to make a final political choice in favor of breaking up with the Russian Federation to be able "to return" to the family of European nations on equal terms and to enjoy the material goods and other benefits of a liberal civilization. Color revolutions besides the coup itself almost always bring about political chaos or like the Americans prefer calling it "controlled" chaos, the introduction of external management (it is sufficient to mention the appointment of foreign "legionnaires" on key positions in the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine), as well as the civil war, the genocide of civilians and military intervention. The country, which has undergone a revolution, does not become freer; on the contrary, in most cases it becomes very dependent on the US and its military and political allies, turning into their colony.
The future of these states is sad: people, economy, natural resources are expendable to instigate color revolutions in other countries, to provoke new international conflicts in which a special role is given to the new actors -States-provocateurs, Washington puppets, ready for anything to please their genuine American "masters."
Quite often, the States-provocateurs (such as Georgia in the Russian-Georgian-South Ossetia conflict in 2008, Ukraine in the civil war in the Donbas or some of the Baltic States, making their territory available for NATO Task Forces to concentrate along the western borders Eventually, most of the assertions of Russian officials and state media about the conflict in Ukraine have proved to be lies; a lot of them have been subsequently denied by the leadership of the Russian Federation itself. The most prominent example was Russia's initial denial that Russian law enforcement agencies participated in the events in Crimea in February and March 2014.11 Later, Russia admitted its forces had participated.12 Even later, it disclosed the details of a pre-planned military operation "to return Crimea to Russia." Similar to these disclosures, the facts in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have revealed that Russia set up, directly managed and broadly controlled the proclamation of the so-called "DNR" and the "LNR," both of which declared independence from Ukraine in April 2014, held pseudo "referendums" and forcibly seized the Luhansk and Donetsk regions.13 These facts include the following issues: • the appointing of militant leaders from among Russian special services staff officers, such as I. Girkin, O. Borodai, V. Antiufeiev and a number of others. As Girkin acknowledged, his unit (which took an active part in the annexation of Crimea) 14 was sent by the Russian Federation to Ukraine and seized Sloviansk, and, as he claimed, the unit consisted of Russians. He confessed he actually had "pulled the trigger of the war" when he stated: "If the unit had not crossed the border, eventually everything would come to an end, as it did in Kharkiv and in Odesa. There would be several dozen killed, burnt, arrested. However, it would come to an end. Practically, it was our unit who waged the war." 15 • the supplying of arms, including heavy weapons to the militants by the Russian Federation 16;
• the financing of "the armed forces," so-called "DNR" and "LNR" by the Russian government 17;
• the training of militants on the territory of Russia, which has been, in particular, mentioned by O. Zakharchenko, one of the leaders of the "DNR" 18; • the opening of "green routes" on the border with Ukraine;
• the appointing of "representatives" of "DNR" and "LNR" in Russian regions from among Russian officials 19; • the subordinating of the "DNR" and "LNR" leaders to senior officials of Russia and V. Putin's allies 20; • the influencing of the militants by Putin,21 who gives them direct instructions 22;
• the advocating by senior Russian leaders for the "exit" of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions from Ukraine (for example, the respect of the "referendum" held by the militants in May 2014,23 the "election" in November 2014) 24 and other actions against the territorial integrity of Ukraine; • the recognizing of the "DNR's" independence by the South Ossetia authorities, who are under complete control of the Kremlin 25; and • the unrelenting heralding of the militants by the Russian Federation's state-controlled media.
International law provides two approaches to the issue of responsibility for the conduct of armed groups in a foreign state. The first is the doctrine of effective control a set out in the ICJ's Nicaragua judgment 26 The second is the overall control doctrine formulated by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case.29 This doctrine implicates a foreign state when it organizes, arms and finances military groups and coordinates or plans their actions, thus exercising "overall control" over them.30 In accordance with these two doctrines, Russia is responsible for the conduct of "DNR" and "LNR" because it directs, equips, finances and supervises the militants. In other words, Russia exercises general and effective control over armed forces that are essentially its proxy combatants.
Moreover com/watch?v= -AitK5LeV9I; "SBU nadala novі bezzaperechnі dokazy uchastі rosіiskykh vіiskovykh It was the Russian army, which in August 2014 occupied a significant part of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, that managed to succeed when the "militia" was almost destroyed. Russia's argument that these soldiers were "on leave" and therefore free from Russian direction and control does not hold water either under Russian legislation or the facts.38
In His assertion is twice-flawed. First, he deceptively cites tabloid Internet resources as special services' reports. Second, apart from this deception, even if Russia did not or does not want to seize the Donbas, this does not mean that Russia does not want to wage war against Ukraine in the Donbas for other reasons, including to weaken Ukraine financially, politically, and in other ways.
The Russian Federation has no international legal arguments to justify its use of force against Ukraine. Thus, its military actions are illegitimate under international law.
Under international law, Russia is an unlawful military aggressor. That is, it has used its armed force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State (Art. 1 of the "Definition of Aggression" of the UNGA resolution № 3314 (XXIX) dated 14 December 1974 49 and Art. 8-bis of Statute of the International Criminal Court).50
More specifically, the existent evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that Russia has waged the following acts of aggression against Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Art. 3 of resolution on the Definition of Aggression and Art. 8-bis of the ICC Statute):
• the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof; • bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; • an attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; and • the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.51 International law imposes a special regime of international responsibility on a State that violates the peremptory norms of general international law, including the prohibition of aggression. Those responsible for committing the crime of aggression are subject to individual criminal responsibility under international law. And the implementation of relevant international legal standards must be mandatory if the international community wants to stop the destruction of international peace and security.
Aggression is the most severe international crime because it violates mandatory international law. Aggression threatens the international legal order and the values common to all States and the international community as a whole. The international legal responsibility of the aggressor State, therefore, demands redress for both the injured State and the international community as a whole.
This redress contemplates restoring the international rule of law, compensating the injured State and imposing sanctions against and restrictions on the breaching State, including economic sanctions. Stronger sanctions can include limitations on the offending State's sovereignty, deprivation of ill-gotten territory, and a ban on certain types of armed forces.
Individuals bear individual criminal responsibility. President V. Putin has repeatedly claimed that the armed men who committed the acts of aggression starting from 26 February 2014 were the Russian military personnel, and, in March 2015, he stated that he personally took the decision to "start working on the return of Crimea to Russia" on the night of 23 March 2014 and was in charge of the military operation.52 Of course, other Russian Federation leaders who acted in concert with President Putin also bear responsibility.
Their responsibility is beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, President Putin's statement amounted to a confession that he and others committed the crime of aggression. Applying a paraphrasing of the relevant standard for liability, he and others planned, prepared, initiated and executed, as persons in positions effectively in control over and directing the political or military action of their State, an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, violated the Charter of the United Nations. These prohibited acts are articulated in Art. 8-bis of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.53 Criminal responsibility in this case can also arise from war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the course of the aggression. The State's authorities are responsible for the promoting, pandering, or failing to take preventive measures against these crimes. The specific institutional mechanisms for acting in this case, which might be the International Criminal Court or an ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal, will depend on further developments. Nevertheless, imposing responsibility on Russia as a State and taking measures by the international community aimed at preventing the repetition of such acts in the future are obligatory.
